Visited KIER Kyoto, Spring 2023.
Dual Auctions for Assigning Winners and Compensating Losers (with Matt van Essen) accepted at Economic Theory.
Expertise, Gender, and Equilibrium Play (with Romain Gauriot and Lionel Page) accepted at Quantitative Economics.
The newly-established Center of Behavioral Institutional Design.
Allocating Positions Fairly: Auctions and Shapley Value (with Matt Van Essen), Journal of Economic Theory 196 (2021), pp. 1-47.
Haifa-NYUAD Joint Seminar in Economics
Elected Fellow of the Econometric Society.
Elected Fellow of the SAET.
From Dynamic Markets for Lemons: Performance, Liquidity, and Policy Intervention (with Diego Moreno), Theoretical Economics 11 (2016), pp. 601-639.
From Auctions with a Buy Price (with Stan Reynolds), Economic Theory 38 (2009), 9-39.
From Minimax Play at Wimbledon (with Mark Walker), American Economic Review 91 (2001), 1521-1538.
From Expertise, Gender, and Equilibrium Play (with Romain Gauriot and Lionel Page), 2022.
From Dynamic Markets for Lemons: Performance, Liquidity, and Policy Intervention (with Diego Moreno), Theoretical Economics 11 (2016), pp. 601-639.
